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Today we face many new issues in terms of technology, political and economic 
relations, humanities, and ecological environment. In addition, these complex 
interests are shaped by responses to globalization and multiculturalism; and they 
are becoming more infl uential to individual lives. Th is kind of era requires under-
standing of and sensitivity to diverse needs, communication, and collaboration. 
Th erefore, mere inculcation or transmission of knowledge has limitations in pre-
paring students to live meaningfully in a changing world. Instead, students need 
embodied reasoning.  
A meaningful and harmonious life coupled with responding to one’s envi-
ronment is always a goal of education, in particular, moral education. In a new 
century, we need to rethink the fundamental meaning of morality and moral edu-
cation. As a few recent researchers claim,1 obeying a society’s rules, laws, and regu-
lations or possessing certain virtues such as knowledge does not necessarily make 
us moral; it may just rather cause us to benumb the virtuous consciousness.
In this view of moral education, we need to examine our current system 
of moral education. As a contemporary and systemic eff ort, character education 
dominates the fi eld of practice in moral education. Philosophers and practitioners 
of character education convince themselves and their students that books on moral 
theory will tell us how we ought to behave. However, recent thinkers interested 
in moral education have argued about the eff ectiveness of character education. 
It could be argued that defi ciencies in contemporary school-based moral educa-
tion have led us down this path to narrowly cognitive, character trait, or general 
values list approaches. It should be also questioned whether it is possible to teach 
virtues directly and whether indoctrination as the method of such inculcation of 
virtues is an appropriate method of education.2 Th e overall problem is grounded 
in a misguided view of reason, following mind versus body dualism and neglect-
ing the importance of aesthetic dimensions of experience. Consequently, moral 
reasoning has been regarded as consisting primarily of discerning the appropriate 
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universal moral principle that tells us the single “right thing to do” in a given situ-
ation.3 Recent empirical research in the cognitive sciences has revealed this concept 
to be false; both our concepts and our reasoning about them are grounded in the 
nature of our bodily experience and are structured by various kinds of imagina-
tive processes. 
We need to provide students the opportunity—in time and space—to reason 
imaginatively and empathetically about how their various actions might alter their 
lives and aff ect the lives of others. For this, it is necessary to change our views of 
reason and meaning, grounded by a far deeper exploration into the qualities, feel-
ings, emotions, and bodily processes that make aesthetic moral education possible. 
Th ere is a rich tradition, culminating in the work of the pragmatist philosopher 
John Dewey, which gives pride of place to aesthetics. 
Dewey insists that “arts are educative,” so that “they open the door to an 
expansion of meaning and to an enlarged capacity to experience the world.”4 Th is 
insight retains remarkable implications for today’s moral education. Aesthetic 
experience is holistic, taking us to a deeper understanding and more enjoyable 
appreciation and investigation of everything that goes into human meaning mak-
ing, regardless of whether it is artistic or not. For Dewey, education needs aesthetic 
elements such as responsiveness, an emotional reaction supplying a delicacy and 
quickness of recognition, sensitiveness, and susceptibility. Dewey also states that the 
individual has a natural tendency to react in such an emotional way, but this natu-
ral disposition requires cultivation, and aesthetic experience aff ords the training 
of an emotional reaction and responsiveness. First, I will explore Dewey’s aesthetic 
theory in relation to moral education. Th en, I will address what diff erence the char-
acteristics inherent to aesthetic experience—feelings and emotions, imagination, 
and embodiment—make in moral education for a new century. 
Dewey’s Aesthetic Theory 
Dewey’s theory of art is the key to his entire philosophy, because his philosophy is 
“all that he meticulously worked on in the areas of logic, metaphysics, epistemol-
ogy, and psychology brought to culmination in his understanding of the aesthetic 
and art.”5 However, it has been only since the mid-1970s that scholars in philosophy 
and education showed increased attention to and positive appreciation of Dewey’s 
important “aesthetic turn” in his scholarship. Drawing principally from Dewey’s 
landmark text Art as Experience, books by Philip M. Zeltner, Joseph H.Kupfer, 
Th omas M. Alexander, and Richard Shusterman have furnished the stimulus for 
much of this scholarship. And three recent books by educators, Jim Garrison’s 
Dewey and Eros, Philip W. Jackson’s John Dewey and the Lessons of Art, and Da-
vid A. Granger’s John Dewey, Robert Pirsig, and the Art of Living, augmented and 
broadly enhanced Dewey’s writings on education. Responding to the search for 
ways to use the fruits of these works more practically in education, this article seeks 
the vision of aesthetic education and means of fostering the art of experience for 
contemporary moral education. 
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Dewey’s treatment of aesthetic experience is not a traditional examination 
of elements within the fi ne arts alone. Rather, it is a serious attempt to show that 
the fi ne arts are a conspicuous example of aesthetic experience, and that they do 
not represent the sole province for aesthetic respect. It attempts to link discussion 
of aesthetic experience and the aesthetics of the fi ne arts by showing an exhaustive 
analysis both of their elements prominently found in the aesthetics and of those 
elements comprising an area included within a broader contextual discussion of 
aesthetic experience. Certain scholars appeared to be unaware of Dewey’s general 
philosophic considerations. 6 Th ey thereby entirely misunderstood and misconstrued 
what he was saying in the work. “Intentionally cultivated” essentially indicates the 
arts; however, it also refers to those objects and activities which deliberately bring 
about aesthetic experience.7 
Dewey argued that art matters because it provides heightened, intensifi ed, 
and highly integrated experiences of meaning, using all of our ordinary resources 
of meaning-making. In education, this is the type of experience that “both the art-
ist or teacher and the audience or students have when both are prepared for and 
enter into a stunning learning encounter.”8 It is because aesthetic experience takes 
us to a deeper understanding and more enjoyable appreciation of what we learn. 
All consummatory experiences are not aesthetic experiences. On the contrary, all 
aesthetic experiences can be considered consummatory experiences. If the art is 
treated like enrichment, a bonus, a luxury, or if the art is emphasized according to 
the eff ect of art classes on S.A.T. scores, experience in even art education cannot be 
termed an aesthetic experience. If any ordinary activity is undertaken for its own 
fulfi llment, however, it then becomes an intentionally cultivated experience and 
can rightly be called an aesthetic experience. 
Dewey’s Thoughts on Aesthetic Experience and Moral 
Education 
Dewey describes in his Ethics the similarities between morality and art in a con-
crete way:  “One of the earliest discoveries of morals was the similarity of judgment 
of good and bad in conduct with the recognition of beauty and ugliness. . . . Th e 
sense of justice, moreover, has a strong ally in the sense of symmetry and propor-
tion. . . . A harmonious blending of aff ections into a beautiful whole was essentially 
an artistic idea.”9 
As Dewey observes in the passage, ethical and aesthetical appreciations have 
much in common. Th e rigid separation of the aesthetic from the moral is rooted 
in the Enlightenment view of cognition that we have inherited. Enlightenment 
thinkers supported the view that “our mental acts can be broken down into sepa-
rate and distinct forms of judgment.” From this perspective, consequently, “moral 
reasoning (judgment) consisted in the application of moral laws to concrete cases, 
on the basis of shared moral concepts. Aesthetic judgment, by contrast, was con-
sidered not to involve any concepts at all, and they were not products of reason.”10 
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In sharp contrast, Dewey saw that the aesthetic permeates every aspect of our lives 
and there are aesthetic dimensions to all of our experience. We human beings seek 
experience that reaches to some level of fulfi llment. “Th e aesthetic is that which 
makes it possible for us to have relatively unifi ed, coherent, meaningful, and con-
summated experiences. Th erefore, the aesthetic is present and intermingles in what 
we think of as the ‘scientifi c,’ the ‘theoretical,’ and the ‘moral.’”11 Hence, Dewey 
refused to disconnect the aesthetic, moral, and intellectual domains. As Garrison 
states, “this refusal has remarkable educational consequences” and educators need 
to “completely reconstruct their curriculum to emphasize the aesthetic and moral 
dimensions of our humanity.”12 
Emotional reaction and immediate sensitiveness are the main qualities of aes-
thetic experience. Th ese claims are essential and original to Dewey’s moral theory. 
For Dewey, without an expansive imagination—one willing to go beyond conven-
tional limits—teachers cannot be free, nor can they free their students. Moreover, 
without imagination they cannot be moral, because morality means the capacity to 
choose as well as to assume responsibility for those values chosen. Creating value 
alternatives instead of just evaluating already existing ones expands possibilities 
for free moral choice. “Imagination is the chief instrument of the good,” Dewey 
states: “Hence it is that art is more moral than moralities. . . . Th e moral prophets 
of humanity have always been poets even though they spoke in free verse or by 
parable.”13 Th is key phrase in the last chapter of the book raises many signifi cant 
points: fi rst, art, whose main quality is imaginativeness, and where immanent bodily 
meaning is paramount, is more moral than moralities or virtues. Imagination is 
fundamental to moral reasoning, and human moral understanding is fundamen-
tally imaginative. Th e aesthetic dimensions of experience—including imagination, 
emotions, and concepts—are what make meaning and the enhancement of quality 
possible, which is the goal of moral education—meaningful lives. Th is idea is also 
connected with Dewey’s conception of the moral person as the product of moral 
education. Citizenship is interpreted in a narrow sense as meaning the capacity 
to vote intelligently, a disposition to obey laws, and so on. However, the child, an 
organic whole, is to take his or her place with reference to various functions. Chil-
dren are not only to adapt themselves to the changes that are going on but also to 
have power to shape and direct those changes.14 Th erefore, a moral education fi lled 
with aesthetic experiences is a more suitable mode of moral education than current 
cognitive and virtue-centered moral education.
Aesthetic  Moral  Education 
Th ose implications are enough to enable us to piece together a fairly comprehen-
sive picture of all they might include and to seek the answer to the question, what 
diff erence does aesthetic experience make in moral education for a new century? 
As a strategic approach, fi rst, I will fl esh out three key aspects of the nature of aes-
thetic experience, and then explain what and how that nature bestows in moral 
education. 
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Characteristics of Aesthetic Experience 
Feelings and Emotions 
Feelings, or emotion, comprise the fi rst characteristic of aesthetic experience that 
functions in moral education. Th is is related to Dewey’s perspective that our primary 
relation to reality is qualitative experience. Th e Deweyan philosopher Jim Garrison 
claims, “we become what we love,” and rephrases that as “what we seek to possess 
soon comes to possess us in thought, feelings, and action.”15 Dewey considers this 
the way that people grow. Th erefore, educating to desire the greatest good with the 
greatest passion should be the goal of moral education. Th at is to say, emotion or 
feeling is essentially important in moral education. It is necessary for teachers and 
education researchers to acknowledge the existence of the precognitive qualitative 
background, insightfulness, teachers’ and students’ intuitions, or the importance 
of mood and feelings to intuition. 
Imagination 
“Aesthetic experience is imaginative,” writes Dewey, even though “[a]ll conscious 
experience has of necessity some degree of imaginative quality.”16 Th is is because 
the diff erence between aesthetic experience and ordinary experience lies in the 
relative predominance of the imaginative element. Imagination predominates in 
aesthetic experience.17 
“Every idea,” writes Dewey, “is by its nature indicative of a possibility not of 
present actuality.”18  In other words, for Dewey, imagination, as an important ele-
ment of aesthetic experience, explores alternative possibilities for actions within a 
selected context of ongoing activity, enables the search for ideas that can possibly 
reconstruct the situation, and suggests alternatives to our habitual ways of inter-
preting things. “Th rough the aesthetic, we grasp the signifi cance of the imagina-
tion as the transformation of the world through action. Th e ontological dimen-
sions of the creative are the intertwining of the actual with the possible and this is 
the context in which action makes sense.”19 In other words, imagination allows us 
to grasp infi nite transformational possibilities and wisdom, enabling us to think 
beyond contemporary society’s laws or norms and to realize the potential of our 
current students. 
Infl uenced by Dewey, Johnson claims that what we need to pursue more than 
anything else in moral education is “moral imagination.” It is because imagination 
provides both self-knowledge and knowledge of other people, about the imaginative 
structure of our moral understanding including its values, limitations, and blind 
spots. In addition, imagination helps us to examine how various actions open to 
us might bestow diff erent our self-identity, relationships, and the lives of others. 
Finally, it enables us to explore imaginatively what the actions and outcomes might 
mean. Th ereby, imagination may lead us to perform this or that action, and to enact 
transformations in our moral understanding, character, and behavior.
In short, moral imagination would provide the means for understanding—of 
self, others, institutions, cultures—for refl ective criticism, and for modest trans-
Dewey’s Aesthetics and Today’s Moral Education  ? 67
Volume 25 (2) ? 2009
formation. Above all, imagination allows us to reveal future possibilities in present 
actualities and to reconstruct reality. As Garrison shows with the example of Martin 
Luther King, Jr., prophet leaders dreamed of visions of “our best possibilities and 
what morally ought to be, not merely reporting the results of an exercise in pure 
reason.”20 Th ose prophet leaders and their attitudes are necessary in our education 
too. Teachers must possess vision like prophet leaders. Th ey must vividly imagine 
the ideals and values that they seek to realize. Th rough moral education whose ideal 
is practical reasoner, our schools and students also need prophetic moral percep-
tion, and such perception requires poetic moral imagination. 
Embodiment 
Because of a pervasive cultural misunderstanding of aesthetics as a nothing but 
subjective mental states, there have been misconceptions that “the mind is disem-
bodied,” “thinking transcends feeling,” or “feelings are not part of meaning and 
knowledge.”21 Th is view has led to misconceptions of meaning and value. Following 
Dewey, however, aesthetics must become the basis of any profound understand-
ing of meaning and thought. An embodied view of meaning is naturalistic, inso-
far as it situates meaning within a fl ow of experience that cannot exist without a 
biological organism engaging its environment. Th e art is where immanent bodily 
meaning is paramount, and aesthetic experience is based upon bodily meaning 
and felt sense. 
Th is rich tradition culminates in Dewey’s work in naturalistic and aesthetic 
theories.22 Th e guiding assumption for such a naturalistic semantics is what Dewey 
called a “principle of continuity.” According to the principle of continuity, what we call 
“body” and “mind” are simply convenient abstractions. In this view, “body” means 
all of the following things: a physical, causally determined entity, a set of organic 
processes, a felt experience of sensations and movement, and a socially constructed 
artifact. As Merleau-Ponty points out, my body is never merely a thing; it is a lived 
body.23 Meaning is grounded in our bodily experience, and reason is an embodied 
process. Along this line, imagination is tied to our bodily processes and can also be 
creative and transformative of experience. Hence, Dewey wrote: “No ‘reasoning’ as 
reasoning, that is, as excluding imagination and sense, can reach truth. . . . [Th e in-
quirer] selects and puts aside as his imaginative sentiments move. ‘Reason’ at its height 
cannot attain complete grasp and a self-contained assurance. It must fall back upon 
imagination—upon the embodiment of ideas in an emotionally charged sense.”24 
As shown in this paragraph, a pragmatist views reason or cognition embod-
ied. Embodied cognition is the result of the evolutionary processes of variation and 
selection. It is situated within a dynamic, ongoing, organism-environment rela-
tionship. Hence, it is problem centered and operates relative to the needs, interests, 
and values of organisms, but not concerned with fi nding some allegedly perfect 
solution to a problem. Rather, embodied cognition works well enough relative to 
the current situation. 
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Implications for Moral Education 
So far I have shown what are the major traits that clarify and identify Dewey’s 
concept of aesthetic experience. In the next part of this chapter, I will show what 
diff erence aesthetic experience can make in moral education, in terms of empathy, 
moral reasoning, moral perception, and moral action. 
Empathy 
Aesthetic experience can help students to care about others’ needs, desires, and 
interests and to respond to them. Empathetic insight is closely akin to aesthetic 
appreciation. As Kupfer states, “the freedom and responsivity enjoyed in aesthetic 
experience is a freedom and responsivity inherent in the process of organiz-
ing aesthetic elements into a community.”25 Aesthetic responsivity can prepare 
us for responding with and to others in the ongoing processes that constitute 
community. Furthermore, when the object of aesthetic perception is human, 
the interactive process makes us, due to the universality of the human condi-
tion, identify with the perceived human object. “Regardless of the nature of the 
object of aesthetic perception—be it human or nonhuman, natural or humanly 
produced, discursive or non-discursive—a necessary condition for savoring its 
richness is the disposition to apprehend it through an unfettered engagement of 
the imagination.”26
What is empathy? In fact, Dewey uses the word “sympathy” and expresses 
his thoughts on sympathy in moral education: 
It is sympathy which carries thought out beyond the self and which ex-
tends its scope till it approaches the universal as its limit. It is sympathy 
which saves consideration of consequences from degenerating into mere 
calculation, by rendering vivid the interests of others and urging us to give 
them the same weight as those which touch our own . . . To put ourselves 
in the place of others, to see things from the standpoint of their purposes 
and values, to humble, contrariwise, our own pretensions and claims . . . 
is the surest way to attain objectivity of moral knowledge.27 
In the passage, Dewey declares “intelligent” sympathy beyond a merely prime 
characteristic in general moral development. Moreover, considering the diff erences 
between the words sympathy and empathy,28 what Dewey meant is more like empa-
thy. Dewey goes further: “Sympathy is the animating mold of moral judgment not 
because its dictates take precedence in action over those of other impulses (which 
they do not do), but because it furnishes the most effi  cacious intellectual standpoint. 
It is the tool, par excellence, for resolving a complex situation.”29 
Many situations involving humans are qualitative contexts requiring intuiting 
data, with the diffi  cult task of intelligent selection and discrimination. In this view, 
empathy is “the best source of data in the social sciences and in moral deliberation.”30 
Without empathy there is always a danger of misunderstanding. Th e empathetic 
and generous recognition of the needs, desires, and hopes of others may propel us 
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beyond the bounds of our fi xed selves. Dewey did not reject “calculating intellect” 
in responding to others, but he also pointed out that, “a person entirely lacking in 
sympathetic response” would have “no spontaneous sense of the claims of others 
for satisfaction of their desires.”31 
Imagination functions essentially in empathy. Dewey writes: “Imagination 
is the chief instrument of the good. It is more or less a commonplace to say that a 
person’s ideas and treatment of his fellows are dependent upon his power to put 
himself imaginatively in their place.”32 
Dewey goes on, however, to hold that the primacy of the imagination extends 
far beyond the scope of direct personal relationships. Except where “ideal” is used 
in conventional deference or as a name for a sentimental reverie, the ideal factors 
in every moral outlook such as human loyalty, love, or justice are also imaginative. 
Th e historic alliance of religion and art has its roots in this common quality. In 
addition, only imagination can help us to see the possibilities of the current condi-
tion of the people in it. 
Furthermore, imagination and emotions combine in particularly impor-
tant ways in such empathetic recognition and response. Recall Dewey’s obser-
vation: “Th e only truly general thought is the generous thought. It is sympathy 
which carries thought out beyond the self and which extends its scope till it ap-
proaches the universal as its limit. It is sympathy which saves consideration of 
consequences from degenerating into mere calculation, by rendering vivid the 
interests of others.”33 
Empathy and visionary imagination allow us to perceive the needs, desires, 
cares, concerns, and interests of our students. As an important part of moral per-
ception, empathy carries us beyond our selfi sh interests and directs our selective 
attention outward toward others, since it relies on seeing others as like us in the 
sense that they, too, have needs, purposes, desires, and interests. Empathetic un-
derstanding is a poetic achievement. It is something called into existence when we 
bestow value on one another. 
Moral Reasoning 
Aesthetic experience helps students to make personal moral judgments in their 
daily situations. Knowledge acquired through aesthetic experience is living knowl-
edge, not merely memorized rules or virtues. To make personal, moral judgment 
appropriately is in accord with having and using wisdom in various situations. Th is 
implication is important, because the goal of moral education for a new century 
should be to help students develop the ability to make appropriate moral judgment 
in more various daily situations than ever, beyond merely following moral laws de-
rived by pure reason alone. 
Dewey rejects the notion that virtue and intelligence are possessions.34 As 
Kupfer states, “no moral system or set of rules is adequate without our practical 
wisdom,”35 since our wisdom is necessary to recognize this rule applies to this situ-
ation or takes precedence over another rule. In the attainment of a moral course of 
conduct as well, there comes a place where precedent and maxims are inadequate. 
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We must respond to the morally relevant aspects of particular situations for which 
no rules are suffi  cient. In other words, we need personal and effi  cient moral rea-
soning for moral understanding of ourselves and our situations. On these points, 
aesthetic activity can help delineate the moral structure of any situation, because 
the aesthetic freedom and responsivity we extend to others defi ne more fully the 
form of community.
Moral reasoning is an embodied and constructive imaginative activity that is 
based, not primarily on universal moral laws, but principally on metaphoric con-
cepts. Imaginative play can open up and allow us to grasp infi nite transformational 
possibilities. Imagination is what opens the doors of perception, including moral 
perception, and allows us to see the infi nite possibilities hidden in the actual. 
Th en, how can we appraise our personal moral reasoning? Like appraisal of 
our imagination discussed earlier, we bear the additional burden of discriminating 
ends that prove desirable aft er mediated refl ection from those immediately desired. 
As a method, Dewey suggests refl ection as a transactional process, which is an con-
cept analogical to Johnson’s “dramatic rehearsal” (in imagination) of various com-
peting possible lines of action. Dewey asserts the prominent role of consequences in 
refl ective inquiry.36  Distinquishing the conception of refl ection as primarily cog-
nitive, Dewey assumes that refl ection originates in the precognitive quality of im-
mediate experience. Refl ective deliberation leads to practical wisdom about values 
and the formation of better habits. For Dewey, “habits are learned responses that 
channel aff ective impulses; therefore, to learn something is to alter our dispositions 
to act in the future.”37 Practical wisdom for situational values and formation of bet-
ter habits, along with desirable dispositions to act, are the goals of moral education 
toward moral growth; therefore, we need aesthetic-moral education.
Moral Perception 
While moral reasoning through aesthetic experience helps students develop prac-
tical wisdom, moral perception allows us to be sensitive to uniqueness, so that we 
can see the needs, desires, and interests of unique individuals interacting in unique, 
one-time-only situations. It also allows us to imaginatively look into the future to 
see the best possibilities in the present. Th e ability to imagine and refl ect on remote 
consequences is necessary, especially among the young in our new century. 
Moral perception is the capacity to comprehend such particular contexts and 
the uniqueness of persons. It is especially important when we need to grasp mutable, 
indeterminate, and vague situations in which rules and clear criteria for their appli-
cation are diffi  cult to determine. It is also allows us to see not just who our students 
are here and now, but to see into the future and imagine their best possibilities. 
Perception and empathetic connection depend on emotion and imagination. 
Moral perception is about recognizing and responding thoughtfully to the needs, 
desires, beliefs, values, and behaviors of others. Perceptions become a self-fulfi lling 
prophecy,38 as we become what we love. Th erefore, teachers should strive to help 
students perceive their own and their world’s best possibilities. Assessing the best 
possibilities is diffi  cult; however, it requires a great deal of imagination. On this 
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point, imagination is the greatest instrument of the good and the most important 
component in the art of prophecy. 
Such aesthetic perceiving has another moral signifi cance in the necessar-
ily nonstereotypic quality of this mode of cognition. Dewey held the moral func-
tion of art itself is to remove prejudice.39 Th erefore, “aesthetic education, which is 
concerned with the acute exciting perception of individuals, not generalities—this 
fl ower, this shell, this painting, this pot—should off set our tendencies to be slaves 
to stereotypes and clichés.”40 
Genuineness and immediacy are attributes of the aesthetic perceiver. Our 
perception of an object’s uniqueness is diff erent from what we customarily dwell 
on, however, because in the normal course of events we are usually absorbed in the 
instrumental properties of such objects and tend to overlook their immediacy. One 
of ultimate purposes of art, in Dewey’s view, is to reawaken our sensitivity, causing 
us to see once again what we have come to overlook about others and ourselves. 
Th ereby, students will be able to imagine their and others’ best possibilities and 
see the diff erences, and to empathize, communicate, understand, and harmonize. 
Moral Action 
Th e ultimate aim of moral education is fulfi lled in students’ moral actions in their 
daily lives. First, this is possible through desire—eros—because we become what 
we love. For instance, people want their lives to be meaningful. Th is desire—this 
eros—for meaning is so strong that people are sometimes even willing to risk death 
in their pursuit of meaning and fulfi llment.41 In this view, the education in eros, 
or passionate desire, should be the supreme aim of education. As the aim of moral 
education is to desire the good, especially, it is necessary to educate eros. 
Th en, how can we foster desire for the good? Th is answer can be found in 
Dewey’s notion of no “mind” versus “body” distinction. For Dewey, 
Th e permanent element of value in the intuitional theory lies in its implicit 
emphasis upon the importance of direct responsiveness. . . . Nothing can 
make up for the absence of immediate sensitiveness. . . . Unless there is a 
direct, mainly unrefl ective appreciation of persons and deeds, the data for 
subsequent thought will be lacking or distorted. A person must feel the 
qualities of acts as one feels with the hands the qualities of roughness and 
smoothness in objects, before he has an inducement to deliberate or material 
with which to deliberate. Eff ective refl ection must also terminate in a situa-
tion which is directly appreciated if thought is to be eff ective in action.42 
In this passage, Dewey implies how sensitivity functions in moral education, 
and it’s not until the qualities are felt that moral thought can be eff ective in moral 
action. For Dewey, all inquiry, not just moral inquiry, begins and ends with an af-
fective intuition that involves a distinct feeling for the quality of a situation. Em-
bodied reason—thought with feeling—ends up as moral action. 
Students acquire knowledge or understand, not by being taught moral rules 
or virtues, but by being familiar with objects—whether they be objects in nature 
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or other human beings. Rather than “descending” from given virtues to real lives, 
students’ moral understanding is “ascending” naturally to moral reasoning aft er 
observing and experiencing personally concrete and actual events in their own lives. 
Again, this is Dewey’s principle of continuity. Meaning and all our higher moral 
reasoning are possible not by introducing from the outside any new metaphysical 
kinds, but by encountering objects or persons directly and aesthetically. 
Conclusion 
Th is chapter opened by raising a need to examine today’s moral education for a 
new century. Beyond moral law theory and the ethics of justice, we need to re-
vise the vision of moral education, by rethinking the fundamental goal: moral 
growth toward a meaningful and harmonious life, responding to one’s environ-
ment. So far I have shown that these are the prominent implications of Dewey’s 
aesthetic theory in relation to moral education for today’s student. Th e inherent 
attributes of Dewey’s aesthetic theory, such as feelings and emotions, imagina-
tion, and embodied reason, compel moral education to help students connect 
thought, feeling, and action in their daily lives. Further research is needed to be-
gin planning methods for applying these implications to realize aesthetic moral 
education in schools. 
Refl ecting on Dewey’s own principal reason for writing Art as Experience, 
we need to “restore the continuity of aesthetic experience with normal processes 
of living.”43 Th is statement makes it profoundly evident that Dewey insists our lives 
should be full of aesthetic experience and our teaching should revolve around aes-
thetic experience. Aesthetic experience is important to all education. In choosing 
moral education as a conspicuous example, this chapter addresses a project that 
shows how important and meaningful it is to rethink Dewey’s aesthetic experi-
ence, especially facing a new century. As Dewey pointed out in his times, modern 
theory and practice in education have laid relatively too much stress upon voli-
tional training in practical control and intellectual training in the acquisition of 
information, and too little upon the training of responsiveness;44 so, too, does our 
current educational system. 
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